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ADVERSE REACTIONS
LOOD is the most potent therapeutic agent used by
physicians in the treatment of patients and in many
instances its administration is life saving. Of course, the
only source of blood for humans is blood donated by
other humans. In order to determine, therefore, whether
a donor's blood would transmit any disease or be harmful
in any way to a potential blood recipient the blood donor
is asked whether he has ever had such diseases as hepatitis,
syphilis, or malaria, and his hemoglobin level, blood pressure and body temperature are determined. In addition,
individuals who are taking drugs which might be considered harmful to a blood recipient are not permitted to
be donors.
When blood is needed by a patient, a specimen of his
blood is obtained and placed in a test tube, which is then
labelled with his name and identification number. The
specimen is then studied for its ABO and Rh type and
in some institutions tests are made for unusual antibodies in the patient's blood which might result in transfusion reactions. After the patient's type is determined,
donor blood of the same ABO and Rh type and the
patient's specimen of blood are mixed in a test tube to
determine compatibility. Several tests are conducted in
order to detect whether or not compatibility exists, and if
an incompatibility is found the blood is not transfused
*B.A., Yeshiva College; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania Law
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and a different unit of blood is similarly tested. The unit
of acceptable blood is then removed from the blood bank
to the patient's bedside and the transfusion is started.
The most common and severe incompatibility reactions
occur where there are errors of the ABO and Rh types.
The most serious transfusion reaction, often resulting in
death or serious morbidity, is the hemolytic transfusion
reaction which results from the rapid destruction of transfused red blood cells in the patient's circulatory system,
or the destruction of a patient's own red cells by antibodies
transfused in the donor blood. This type of reaction is
usually caused by the transfusion of the wrong unit of
blood into the patient as a result of technical or clerical
errors. These errors include: incorrect labelling of the
blood container; defective typing serum which can result
in erroneous ABO and Rh typing; or human error,
such as an error in recording the correct typing
result or recording the typing result for the wrong unit
of blood. Other errors can result from the submission
to the blood bank of a blood specimen with the name
of the wrong patient on the tube. Since the hemolytic
transfusion reaction is usually the result of technical or
clerical errors it is almost always preventable. However,
on occasion this reaction will occur despite the use of all
proper procedures, precautions and safeguards.'
The least serious and most frequent transfusion reactions are the "allergic" reactions which are usually manifested by skin rashes, fever, and chills during or after the
transfusion. These reactions are usually of no serious
consequence to the patient and result from an allergic
reaction to some of the contents of the blood which are
being transfused, such as white blood cells, platelets, plasma
proteins, or other plasma constituents. They occur most
often in patients who have been transfused many times
or in women who have had multiple pregnancies. There is
no adequate way at the present time of preventing these
reactions.
'See P. L. MOLLINSON,
ch. 12 (4th ed. 1967).
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The second most serious complication of blood transfusion is serum hepatitis which is transmitted by donor
blood. This reaction may result in death or in serious
morbidity. There is no known way at the present time
of detecting a hepatitis carrier and there is no test available
which will screen out those bloods capable of transmitting
hepatitis. There have been many attempts to identify
those blood donors who are capable of transmitting hepatitis. The most commonly used tests have been those of
liver function, which have proved unreliable in screening
out these hepatitis carriers. At the present time there
is an intensive effort to find a test which will detect
the hepatitis virus carriers so that they can be excluded
as blood donors. The only acceptable means of screening
out possible carriers is to question the patient carefully
for a previous history of hepatitis or jaundice as well
as to obtain a history of recent exposure to hepatitis or
of any of the symptoms which might suggest that the
donor might be in the early stages of hepatitis. This attempt is of limited value, however, since the potential
donor may not be aware that he is a carrier and in many
cases may lie or fail to disclose such facts to the examining
nurse or doctor. The latter situation is especially prevalent
among donors to commercial blood banks, some of whom
are drug addicts or chronic alcoholics, as will be more
fully discussed below.
LEGAL LIABILITY

As indicated above, the hemolytic transfusion reaction
is usually caused by technical or clerical errors in the
handling of the transfused blood, and is almost always
preventable. On the other hand, blood transfusion reactions resulting in the contraction of serum hepatitis are
almost never preventable by reason of the impossibility of
detecting the presence of the hepatitis virus in the donor
blood. Thus, the cases dealing with legal liability for
hemolytic transfusion reactions and transfusion reactions
not involving serum hepatitis, have been decided under
traditional theories of tort law. These cases have usually
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dealt with the issues of negligence of the physician or
hospital administering the blood transfusion and questions
of causation.2 However, the cases dealing with the liability
for the contraction of serum hepatitis have, by virtue of
the impossibility of detecting that virus, been forced to
proceed upon some theory of absolute liability, either under
warranty theory or under a theory of strict liability in
tort.
The distinction between warranty and an action in
tort was that in the case of a sale of goods a warranty
gave rise to a cause of action without fault for a breach
thereof, whereas negligence must have been pleaded and
proved before a recovery was permitted under traditional
tort rules.' Since fault can almost never be shown in
serum hepatitis transfusion reaction cases, it followed that
warranty theory might be a possible vehicle for recovery
in such cases. Or so the lawyers thought before the
courts spoke.
PRLMUTTER AND ITS AmTEmATH

The case that has had the most profound effect in this
area is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.' This was
an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while a patient in a hospital maintained and operated by the defendant. It was alleged
that the injuries resulted from the transfusing of "bad"
blood supplied by the hospital for a price as part of the
customary service rendered by the hospital to its patients.
As a result of such transfusion of "bad" blood, the patient
allegedly became afflicted with homologous serum hepatitis.
The plaintiff predicated her action on the theory that
the supplying of blood constituted a "sale" within the Sales
2 For cases dealing with these types of blood transfusion reactions and
liability for negligence arising out of particular acts or omissions, including
technical and clerical errors in the course of such transfusions, see Annot.,
59 A.L.R.2d 768 (1958).
3Aegis Productions, Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of America, 25 App. Div.
2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1st Dep't 1966).

4308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
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Act and that there attached implied warranties imposed by
that statute that the blood was "reasonably fit for the purpose" and of "merchantable quality."
The court, in a landmark opinion, held that the transfusion of blood by a hospital to a patient constituted a
"service" rather than a sale of goods and that plaintiff
could not, therefore, recover for breach of an implied warranty under the Sales Act. The court left untouched the
question of the hospital's liability for negligence, if any.
In so holding the court said:
While determination, as to whether the essence of a particular
contract is for the rendition of services or for the sale of property,
may at times be troublesome and vexatious, there is no doubt that
the main object sought to be accomplished in this case was the
care and treatment of the patient. The supplying of blood by the
hospital was entirely subordinate to its paramount function of furnishing trained personnel and specialized facilities in an endeavor
to restore plaintiff's health. It was not for blood-or iodine or
bandages-for which plaintiff bargained, but the wherewithal of the
hospital staff and the availability of hospital facilities to provide
whatever medical treatment was considered advisable. The conclusion is evident that the furnishing of blood was only an incidental and very secondary adjunct to the services performed by the
hospital and therefore, was not within the provisions of the Sales
Act. The fact that the treatment might have come from a physician, while the blood came from the hospital, is of no operative
consequence; it is the transaction, regarded in its entirety, which
must determine its nature and character. As long as it involves
the medical care and treatment of a patient at a hospital, it is
immaterial that it is the doctor who may diagnose and treat and
the hospital which may supply facilities and material ....
In this case, it is plain that what the complaint alleges and truly
describes is not a purchase and sale of a given quantity of blood,
but a furnishing of blood to plaintiff for transfusion at a stated
sum, as part of, and incidental to, her medical treatment.5
In arriving at this conclusion the court noted there was
"neither a means of detecting the presence of the jaundiceproducing agent in the donor's blood nor a practical method
of treating the blood to be used for transfusion so that the
danger may be eliminated." ' The court reasoned, therefore,
5

Id. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.

6 Id,
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that to impose liability upon the hospital in such circumstances would render it responsible, "virtually as an insurer," if anything happened to the patient as a result of
the "bad" blood.

In a vigorous dissent, concurred in by three of the
court's seven judges, it was contended that the transfusion
of blood was indeed a "sale."

The dissent noted further

that the majority, in concluding that there was no means
of detecting hepatitis in the donor's blood, relied "upon

so-called medical reports which are neither in the record
nor even mentioned in the briefs-matter which plaintiff
has had no opportunity to rebut either by evidence or by
argument-indeed, plaintiff is now prevented from furnish-

ing any evidence whatever." I
Other states have followed the Perlmutter case and

have denied the liability of hospitals for breach of implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability in serum hepatitis
transfusion reaction cases.'
These cases have uniformly
held that the transfusion of blood by a hospital to a patient
constituted a "service" and not a "sale."
However, other cases point out the weakness of the
"service-sale" distinction established by the Perlmutter

court.

Thus, several New York cases have presented the

question of whether a plaintiff could recover under a theory
of express warranty in blood-transfusion reaction cases.9
7id. at 111, 123 N.E.2d at 798.

8Arizona: Whitehurst v. American National Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App.
326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965).
Colorado: Sloneker v. St Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo.
1964).
Georgia: Lovett v. Emory Univ., 116 Ga. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
Minnesota: Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Mem. Blood Bank, 270
Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
Utah: Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12
Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961)
(action was for death of patient
allegedly resulting from transfusion of incompatible blood).
Washington: Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774,
296 P.2d 662 (1956) (blood incompatibility case).
Wisconsin: Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d
324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964). See also Hidy v. State, 207 Misc. 207, 137
N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ct. Cl. 1955). af'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 644, 151 N.Y.S.2d 621
(4th Dep't 1956), af'd, 3 N.Y.2d 756, 143 N.E.2d 528, 163 N.Y.S.2d 985
(1957).
9 Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 898, 252 N.Y.S.2d 419
(2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 610, 224 N.E.2d 891, 278 N.Y.S.2d
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In one lower court decision it was held that a complaint
which alleged an express warranty that blood was fit for
transfusion and that such transfusion Would not be harmful to plaintiff's intestate, stated a cause of action against
a hospital for breach of warranty."0
The court distinguished the Perlmutter case on the ground that the question of express warranty was not passed upon in that case. 1
However, this view would appear to be unsound in that it
can hardly be said that an express warranty exists as to a
transaction that has been denominated a "service" rather than
a "sale" by New York's highest court. Thus, if under
Perlmutter a blood transfusion by a hospital is not a "sale"
but a "service" for the purpose of implied warranties of
fitness and merchantability, it would be anomalous to hold
that it could be a "sale" for the purpose of asserting express warranties."
The basic unsoundness, however, of the "service-sale"
distinction as applied to blood transfusion cases becomes
even more apparent in another situation. When a hospital
furnishes blood collected by its own blood bank to its patients it may be argued that the supplying of such blood is
not a "sale," but a "service," just as the supplying of bandages or iodine by the hospital. But, when a hospital
obtains blood from outside sources, such as commercial or
non-commercial blood banks, this reasoning breaks down.
When commercial or non-commercial suppliers provide
a unit of blood to a hospital, a charge is made therefor.
This charge is usually made to the hospital and then passed
on to the patient. The difference between commercial and
non-commercial suppliers of blood is simply that the former
398 (1967); Chesire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278
N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Napoli v. St. Peter's Hosp., 213 N.Y.S.2d
6 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
'oNapoli v. St. Peter's Hosp., 213 N.Y.S2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
"See Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 898, 252 N.Y.S.2d
419 (2d Dep't 1964) (dissenting opinion) which also makes this distinction.
However, this view was apparently rejected by the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the dismissal of the action upon counsel's opening statement.
12See also Aegis Productions, Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of America, 25
App. Div. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1st Dep't 1966), reiterating the
necessary sales basis for the attachment of warranties; Chesire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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are in the business of supplying blood as a distinct commodity for a profit, while the latter are nonprofit organizations and function to serve the community.
It is apparent, therefore, that the "service" rationale
enunciated in Perlmutter is inapplicable as to such suppliers of blood, since it cannot be said that they "service"
a patient in a hospital in the same sense that the hospital
does. Furthermore, the underlying financial transaction
itself, whereby the blood is supplied by such organizations
to the hospital, surely appears to be a "sale" since it
involves the supplying of goods for a consideration. And
yet the courts have reached the same results as to commercial and nonprofit blood banks as they have to hospitals,
and have denied liability in cases involving the contraction
of serum hepatitis after blood transfusions. 13 It is suggested that if this result is to be justified it can only be done
on a basis other than the "service-sale" distinction enunciated in Perlmutter.
The courts' reluctance to impose liability in such cases
of nonprofit suppliers of blood, is understandable. Thus,
in one case the court reasoned that the defendant, the
American National Red Cross, was not liable under a
theory of a breach of implied warranty, in that the furnishing of blood by that organization to the patient was not a
"sale" but a "gift." ' The court noted that the agreement
between the patient's hospital and the blood bank provided
that no charge for the blood was to be made to the recipient
of such blood."5 Thus, although the court denied liability
'3 Krom v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 761,
180 N.Y.S.2d
99 (3d Dep't 1958), rearg. denied, 14 App. Div. 2d 458, 218 N.Y.S.2d 587
(1961); Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326,
402 P.2d 584 (1965); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Mem. Blood Bank,
270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
14 Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402
P.2d 584 (1965).
15 The agreement between the patient's hospital, Tuscon Medical Center,
and the Blood Bank provided further that the hospital would reimburse
the Bank for part of the operating cost for the collection, processing and
distribution of blood, amounting to a total of $4.95 per unit for whole
blood used. The hospital charged the plaintiff $5.20 for each pint of
blood, of which sum it reimbursed $4.90 to the Blood Bank under this
agreement. The court noted the obvious fact that the sum of $4.95, reimbursed to the Blood Bank by the hospital, was sufficient to pay for
only a part of the Bank's operating cost for the collection, processing and

distribution of the blood,
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in this case and characterized the furnishing of blood by
the Blood Bank as a "service," the result it reached can
readily be accepted if the furnishing of blood be viewed as
a "gift," which it apparently actually was. There should,
of course, be no application of warranty law in the complete
absence of a "sale" and in an entirely non-commercial
transaction.
In another case involving a nonprofit blood bank the

court analyzed the policy considerations underlying Perlmutter more closely. 6 In denying a claim predicated upon
breach of implied warranty in the sale of impure blood
and upon strict liability in tort, the court said:

Plaintiffs seek to distinguish the Perlmutter case on the basis that
the defendant here is not a hospital as it was there. But we cannot concede that defendant, which is a nonprofit corporation, should
be treated differently than a hospital or that it should be characterized as a commercial business which offers its products for
sale in the market place in competition with others for the sole
motive of making a profit. The acts performed by the hospital in
the Perlmutter case are not so unrelated to those performed by the
defendant in the case before us as to justify a different result....
VATe find it difficult to give literal application of principles of law
designed to impose strict accountability in commercial transactions
to a voluntary and charitable activity which serves a humane and
public health purpose. The activities involved in the transfusion
of whole blood, a component of the living body, from one human
being to another may be characterized as sui generis in that the
sequence of events involve acts common to legal concepts of both
a sale and a service. Moreover, it seems to us that under the
facts in the case before us it would be unrealistic to hold that there
is an implied warranty as to qualities of fitness of human blood on
which no medical or scientific information can be acquired and in
respect to which plaintiffs' physician has the same information,
knowledge and experience as the supplier.' 7
The New York courts have reached the same result in
the case of commercial suppliers of blood for a profit.
Thus, in the case of Krom
nv. Sharp and Dohme,8 the plaintiff brought an action against a commercial supplier of
16 Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Mem. Blood Bank, 270 Minn. 151,
132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
17 Id. at 155, 132 N.W.2d at 810-11.

is 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S2d 99 (3d Dep't 1958).
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blood based upon breach of warranty in the sale of blood
plasma manufactured or processed by it. The plaintiff contended that the hospital, which was not a party to the
action, in making the purchase of plasma from the defendant, did so as the agent for any patient that might require
the infusion of such plasma. The court affirmed an order
dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action based on warranty.
In so doing the court relied upon the Pe'lmwiter rule that
the supplying of blood was a service, not a sale. The court
reasoned further that the hospital could not be considered
as an agent of the plaintiff's intestate in the purchase of
the blood, since none of the ordinary elements of agency
were present and the patient, allegedly the principal, had
no right of control as to the result or the means to be used.
It is suggested that the decision in Krom is no longer
valid, even if it was correct under New York law when
decided. In the first place, it must be conceded that a
"sale" was consummated between the hospital and the comSecondly, today it
mercial supplier of blood (Krom).
would be irrelevant that the hospital did not act as the
patient's agent in the purchase of the blood, or that the
former and not the latter paid the commercial supplier for
such blood. In either event, under recent New York decisions greatly limiting the privity requirement, warranties
arising from such "sale" of blood should run in favor of all
persons whose use of the blood is within the reasonable
contemplation of the suppliers.19 The fact, therefore, that
the hospital and not the patient was a party to the sale of
the blood by the commercial supplier should not be determinative, since the use of such blood by the patient was
certainly contemplated by the supplier and any warranties
arising from the sale should therefore run in favor of the
patient."
19 Rooney v. S. A. Healy Co., 20 N.Y.2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 383, 281
N.Y.S.2d 321 (1967); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y2d
432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Kopera v. Fisher Scientific Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 851, 259 N.Y.S.2d 165 (2d Dep't 1965). See
also Wilsey v. Sam Mulkey Co., 56 Misc. 2d 480, 289 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup.
Ct. 1968).
20As enacted in New York, section 2-318 of the UNrmoit
CmmERCAL
CODE extends express or implied warranties to "any natural person who is
in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
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THEORY

If the liability of commercial and non-commercial suppliers of blood is to be denied today in these circumstances,

it should be on some basis other than that such suppliers are
performing a "service" rather than a "sale" of blood under

the Perlmutter theory.

At least one lower court decision

in New York has recognized the need for some other ra-

tionale if commercial blood banks are to be relieved from
liability in these circumstances. In this case, involving the
contraction of serum hepatitis as a result of a blood transfusion, the court denied the liability of a commercial supplier of blood and said:
It was indicated in Perlmutter that informed opinion then was
that there existed no means of detecting the presence of injury
causing factors in the donor's blood or a practical method of treating the blood to be used so that danger may be eliminated. Although the case was decided fourteen years ago, plaintiff has given
no indication that medical science has overcome these impediments.

Therefore, even if contrary to the Third Department holding in
Krom, a distinction were to be made between hospital and commercial blood supplier, there is nothing shown herein to establish
2

that the plaintiff's claim is capable of proof. '

The latter court, in denying the liability of a commercial supplier of blood, apparently did so on the basis that

it was impossible to detect the presence of hepatitis in the
if it "is" reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty." The explicit terms of this section would not appear to apply
to the usual situation wherein a patient pays a charge to the hospital for
the blood supplied and sold to the latter by a commercial supplier. In
these circumstances, the "sale" of blood is actually between the supplier
and the hospital.
Section 2-318 would apparently not apply since the
"patient is not "in the family or household of his [hospital]" and is not
"a guest in [the hospital's] home." However, the cases in this area (cited
in note 19 siepra) have considerably extended the protection afforded
persons not in privity with the manufacturer of an item beyond the scope
of section 2-318. Other states have done so by amending section 2-318, or
by eliminating it altogether. See 10 PERSONAL IJtuRY NmVsLM7rR, No.
18, at 206, March 20, 1967; 9 PERSONAL INJUmy NmVsLETrm, No. 2, at

20, 2July
26, 1965.
1

1Heitner v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1968, at 12, col. 2.
The facts alluded to in the text and not contained in the court's opinion
are taken from the briefs of the parties. For an examination of the entire
court record in this case, see Heitner v. The City of Ne'w York, Supreme
Court of the State of New York, Bronx Co., Index No. 7367/63.
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donor's blood, rather than on the basis of the Perlmutter

"sale-service" dichotomy. To impose warranty liability
in such circumstances would be to render the commercial
supplier an insurer of the blood supplied by it, which the
court was not prepared to do.
At least one court has rejected the "sale-service" dis-

tinction as to commercial and non-commercial blood banks.
Thus, while the Florida courts have followed Perlmutter

and have held that the supplying of blood by a hospital
to a patient constitutes a "service," rather than a "sale," 22
they have also held that a commercial or nonprofit blood
bank, which supplied blood to a patient for a consideration,
has made a "sale" and that there may be a cause of action

against it for breach of warranty. 22

In one case a Florida

22White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla.
App. 1968); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. App. 1967).
23In Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla.
App. 1966), the appellate court reversed a trial court decision which
granted a non-commercial blood bank's motion to dismiss. The appellate
court reasoned that it seemed to be a distortion to take what was arguably a sale, twist it into the shape of a service and then employ this
transformed material in erecting the framework of what was really a
policy decision. The court then held that the law of implied warranty
applied to the supplying of blood by a blood bank, but that the manufacturer or supplier of such blood would not be liable under any warranty theory unless there was a factual showing that the blood could
be made safe. However, the Supreme Court of Florida, on appeal, 196
So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967), held that that portion of the appellate court's
decision holding that the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action for
breach of implied warranty as to the blood bank was correct, and that
the case was properly remanded by the appellate court for trial on the issue
of fact as to whether any such warranty was breached. However, the
supreme court held that the issues of whether there was a recognized
method of detection for hepatitis, and whether such fact would constitute a legal defense to the action were premature. The portions of
the appellate court's decisions dealing with such issues were accordingly,
declared to be surplusage and were expunged.
In a concurring opinion
by Justice Roberts, 196 So. 2d at 119, it was pointed out that the
holding of the appellate court that a blood bank could be liable for breach
of implied warranties only if the hepatitis virus was capable of detection,
was contrary to the very basis of the strict or implied warranty theory,
i.e., liability without fault. In his opinion, therefore, that decision was
in conflict with an earlier Florida case Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
(In that case a cigarette manufacturer was
held liable for the injurious consequences resulting from the use of its
product even though, at the time of consumption thereof by the plaintiff's
decedent, the harmful effects of the product were not and could not, by
the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have been known
by the manufacturer of the cigarettes.)
Justice Roberts distinguished
between adulterated and non-adulterated products and stated that the
blood containing the hepatitis virus is in the category of "adulterated
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court has held that even though there may be no way to
detect or eliminate the hepatitis virus once the blood has
been taken, a jury might well find that the risk of its being
present could have been greatly minimized through more
careful screening of donors. 4 That court, in reversing
summary judgment entered in favor of a commercial blood
bank, said:
A blood bank, in order to be accredited by the proper authorities,
is required to ask certain questions concerning the donor's general
health, well being, diseases and other relevant matters before taking
his blood. Albanese [one of the 2 donors] testified by deposition
that he was asked none of these questions prior to the taking of his
blood by the blood bank. Even though Albanese stated that he
would have answered any such questions in the negative, a jury
might reasonably infer that there had been a similar failure to
screen the other donor at the time his blood was taken and that
this amounted to a breach of the blood bank's implied warranty
to take necessary
precautions to minimize the risk of obtaining
2
impure blood. 5
It is suggested that the approach taken by the Florida
courts represents a significant step forward in this area.
It should be noted that in none of the Florida cases has it
actually been held that a blood bank was liable for breach
of implied warranty in the sale of blood. The most that
can be said now is that Florida has held that a blood bank
may be liable under warranty theory and that the issue of
whether an implied warranty exists or was breached is one
of fact. This approach would appear to be sounder than
that taken by the Perlmutter line of cases, which have
decided cases in this area upon the basis of an artificial
distinction between a "service" and a "sale".

products," along with canned meat, bottled drinks, candy sealed in a
wrapper and other similar products intended for human consumption, and
which may give rise to an action for implied warranty against the
manufacturer or supplier thereof. Thus, Justice Roberts would hold a
blood bank liable for breach of implied warranty, whether or not there
is a24 method of detecting the hepatitis virus in the blood of the donor.
Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. App. 1967).
25d. at 209.
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STRICT LIABLITY

In a recent New Jersey case the court rejected in its
entirety the "sale-service" distinction enunciated in Perl26
mutter. In the case of Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital,
the issue presented upon motions for summary judgment
was the liability of a commercial blood bank and a hospital
for the contraction of hepatitis by a patient as a result of
a blood transfusion. The transfused blood was purchased
by the hospital from a commercial supplier for 18 per
container. The hospital charged the patient $25 for each
container of blood and $20 for the transfusion thereof. It
was not disputed that there was and is no test for determining whether human blood contains the hepatitis virus. The
court noted further that every bottle of blood furnished by
the hospital bore a disclaimer to the effect that despite the
utmost care in the selection of donors, human blood may
contain the hepatitis virus and that the blood bank did not
warrant against its presence in the blood. The plaintiffs
proceeded on the theories of negligence, implied warranty
of fitness of the blood for the use intended, and strict liability in tort for furnishing dangerously defective goods.
The court reviewed the case law in this area and concluded
that:
If these valuable organizations [hospitals and blood banks] are to
be exempted from liability, the immunity should be based upon the
true policy consideration and not upon an irrelevant circumstance.27
The court then held that as to both hospitals and blood
banks:
The transfer of human blood for a consideration is a sale. So is
its transfusion 2 8into the body of a patient when a charge is made
for the blood.

2696 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967). See also Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 637, aff'd sub norn. Magrine v. Spector,
100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968), which was an action to recover
for injuries sustained when a hypodermic needle broke in plaintiff's jaw.

The court asserted that it was doubtful that New Jersey would follow
Perlnutter, at least insofar as the latter case held that a "sale" was not
involved in the supplying of blood, or that such description of the transaction was necessary to establish strict liability.
27 96 N.J. Super. at 324, 232 A.2d at 884.
28

Id.
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In dealing with the issue of the blood bank's strict liability in tort, the court relied on Section 402-A of the
Restatement of Torts 2d (1965) which, because of its
potential importance for this area, warrants some extensive
comments here.
That section deals with the liability of a seller of a
product for physical harm to the user or consumer. The
black-letter rule, according to the Restatement, imposes
strict or absolute liability regardless of exercise of due
care upon the seller of a product "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" although
"the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller."
In Comment m. to that section it is stated that the
instant section has become associated with a theory of strict
liability in tort, as distinguished from the strict liability
under the theory of warranty which has become identified
in practice with a contract of sale between a plaintiff and
a defendant. The Comment concludes that the courts can
still continue to apply the rule enunciated in this section
under the label of "warranty," if the courts recognize that
the subject warranty is a different kind from that usually
found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the
various contract rules such as: the necessity for reliance
on the reputation, skill or judgment of the seller by the
buyer; the privity requirements normally associated with
warranty theories and with other aspects of the laws of
contracts; or the various sales codes relating to warranties.
It thus appears that the crucial question under this
approach is whether a product is in a "defective condition"
and "unreasonably unsafe" to the user. With respect to
products which cannot be made absolutely safe, in which
category blood containing the hepatitis virus appears to
belong, Comment k. to that section states:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being
made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is in-

jected.

Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
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both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are' fully justified,
notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve. Such a product properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines,
and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be
sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs
as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps
even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and the use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with
the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk. (Emphasis supplied)

The court in Jackson noted further that the rules
referred to and quoted above were based upon policy considerations in which the means available for avoiding the
risk of harm must be weighed against the utility of the
product. In the light of these rules the court concluded
that blood containing the hepatitis virus was an "unavoidably unsafe product" within the meaning of Comment k.
The court noted in this regard that unlike other products
liability cases, wherein strict liability had been imposed
upon manufacturers or suppliers, the harmful agent, i.e.,
the hepatitis virus, may be present in the blood without

any errors or oversight whatsoever on the part of the suppliers of the blood and that the latter were in no position
to know or control the condition. There could, accordingly,
be no implied representation that the blood was free of the
virus. The court concluded therefore, that the conclusive
presumption of fault underlying the imposition of strict
liability upon a producer or manufacturer was inapplicable
and that if blood was properly collected, preserved and
marketed and proper warning given, the seller was not to
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending its use.
Plaintiff's claim for the breach of implied warranty as
a basis for the defendant's strict liability was denied by
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the court on the ground of the disclaimer of warranty, referred to above. The court held that such disclaimer was
valid and reasonable, since the presence of the hepatitis
virus was not detectable. However, the aforesaid disclaimer
was held to have constituted an "express warranty" by the
blood bank that it had, in fact, exercised the utmost care
in the selection of donors. Accordingly, the court entered
summary judgment in favor of both defendants on the
claims based upon strict liability in tort and implied warranty of merchantability, but denied such relief as to the
claims based upon express warranty and negligence.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court just recently took a giant step toward the possible acceptance of the
strict liability and implied warranty theories.29 It concluded that the evidence before the lower court was too
"meagre" to decide the case on summary judgment and
directed that:
At the trial, a complete record should be made, including not only
detailed testimony as to the nature of the defendants' operations,
but also expert testimony as to the availability of any tests to

ascertain the presence of viral hepatitis in blood, the respective

incidences of hepatitis in blood received from commercial blood
banks and other sources, and such other available testimony and
materials as may be relevant to any of the questions presented by
the parties, including such economic and other factors as may bear

on the question of whether the doctrine of implied warranty or
strict liability should apply to deliveries
blood. .... 30

and transfusions

of

Whether this decision harkens the approach of strict
liability as to blood banks must, of course, await future
developments. It is clear, however, that this court intends
to conduct the search for policy considerations which has
so far been avoided by the cases following Perlmutter.
CONCLUSION

It is suggested that the courts should avoid applying
the "sale-service" distinction in deciding cases in this area.
Instead, they should decide such cases solely upon the basis
20 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
:3oId. at 3, col. 5.
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of the policy considerations underlying the imposition or
denial of liability, regardless of whether the plaintiff's claim
is framed under warranty theories or under a theory of
strict liability in tort. That the theory under which the
plaintiff is proceeding in a blood transfusion reaction case
should not be determinative of liability is clearly indicated
by a New York decision recognizing that:
A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of
the sales contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious
wrong suable by a nancontractingparty whose use of the warranted
article is within
the reasonable contemplation of the vendor or
3
manufacturer. 1
In that case the court held that an airplane manufacturer's implied warranty of fitness of the airplane ran in
favor of an airline passenger who was not in privity with
the manufacturer. However, the court recognized that under the guise of applying warranty law, it was imposing a
species of strict liability in tort, which it described as
"surely a more accurate phrase." 2
Thus, if considerations of policy indicate that imposition of liability is proper, the courts should so hold and
reject the artificial reasoning established in Perlmutter.
Conversely, if such considerations lead to the belief that
liability should be denied, this should again be done, on the
sole ground of policy alone, without any regard to the
formal characterization of the blood transfusion as a "sale"
or a "service."
31 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191
N.E.2d 81, 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (1963) (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
See also Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967), in
which the court recognized that strict liability in tort for harm caused
by defective merchandise sold or supplied for a consideration was the same
cause of action as that asserted under warranty theory.
33 For a view that a holding that the supplying of blood constitutes a
sale would not necessarily require a court to impose liability upon suppliers
of blood under traditional warranty theory, see Comment, 37 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 115, 120 (1968). It should also be noted that Florida has left
open the question of whether the undetectability of the hepatitis virus
would be a defense to a supplier of blood in an action for breach of
warranty, although the latter theory apparently runs counter to the very
basis of liability without fault under warranty law, See supra note 2,3,
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Much can be said for and against the imposition of
absolute liability upon commercial and non-commercial suppliers of blood in these cases. It has been suggested that
even as to nonprofit blood banks, the financial burden of
the risk should be borne by the bank and thus distributed
among all of the users, rather than to require such losses
to be borne by the innocent victims alone.34
A step toward imposition of absolute liability can be
seen in the case of Hoder v. Sayet.3" In that case it was
contended that it was negligence per se for a hospital to
purchase or obtain blood from a commercial blood bank
because commercial procurement increased the likelihood of
hepatitis-infected blood. The court rejected this approach,
but in denying the hospital's motion for summary judgment
the court said that any purchase by the hospital from a
blood bank which it knew, or should have known, was
operating below minimum standards of care would have
constituted a breach of the hospital's duty to use due care
in the acquisition of blood for its patients.
This argument may become increasingly more potent in
view of recent findings that the risk of transmitting the
hepatitis virus to the recipient of the blood is increased by
the use of blood obtained from commercial sources." In
one study the observed rate of the occurrence of hepatitis
was studied in 42 adult patients undergoing corrective
cardiac operations utilizing cardiopulmonary bypass. Among
those patients receiving blood, 96% of which came from
paid donors, the attack rate of hepatitis was 60% (25 out
of 42). Whereas, in another group of 13 patients receiving
blood, 97% of which was obtained from voluntary donors,
no cases of hepatitis were found. 7 One reason assigned for
this phenomenon is that "commercial donors often include
persons of extremely low socio-economic status who sell
34

Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 121 (Fla.

App. 1966) (concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts). But see Jackson
v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 328 A.2d 879. 887 (1967).
35 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. App. 1967).
36 N.Y. Times, Nov, 3, 1968, § E. at 11.
37 Report delivered by Drs. John H. Walsh, Robert H. Purcell, Andrew
G. Morrow, and Paul T. Schmidt, 21st Annual Meeting of American
Ass'n of Blood Banks, Oct. 29, 1968.
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their blood periodically because they need the money. It
might be a reasonable guess that these persons are a common source of hepatitis virus." "
In attempting a policy analysis in this area it is suggested that the courts might well consider these possible
effects of a holding imposing absolute liability upon hospitals and blood banks:
(1) If a rule of strict liability is adopted for hepatitis
associated with blood transfusions the consequences from a
medical viewpoint might be extremely harmful to the general public. Physicians who transfuse blood would then be
frugal in its use and would transfuse patients less freely
than they do at the present time. The result would probably be less use of blood in those situations where blood
might not be absolutely indicated with no resulting harm
to the patient and no risk of hepatitis. However, in those
medical situations where blood might be helpful in decreasing mortality and morbidity, irreparable harm and death
might result from the hesitancy on the part of the physician
to transfuse blood. The decision not to use blood by the
physician in certain indicated medical situations might
leave the physician open to a malpractice suit. At the
present time the medical profession is keenly aware of the
hepatitis complication resulting from blood transfusion and
as a rule does not transfuse patients unless there is a good
medical indication.
(2) From a practical financial viewpoint, if absolute
liability is imposed for the contraction of hepatitis following blood transfusions, insurance companies might refuse to
offer insurance coverage to those doctors who transfuse
patients, or might charge premiums which may be prohibitive for the average practicing physician to pay. As a
consequence, physicians might refuse to treat patients who
would, or might, require blood transfusions which might
result in poor medical care for the community. If hospitals
are also held liable for hepatitis associated with blood
transfusions the consequence of legal action taken against
38 N.Y. Times, supra note 36.

1969 ]

BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS-LIABILITY

577

them will also increase hospital costs and place a huge
economic burden on them.
(3) The imposition of absolute liability arising out
of the use and sale of commercially obtained blood, on the
ground that such blood carries with it a higher risk of
contracting hepatitis, would result in a dangerous shortage
of blood. Blood collected from commercial blood banks
represents a large percentage of the blood available for
transfusion purposes. In the New York City area approximately fifty percent of all blood transfused is obtained from
commercial blood banks. If the blood obtained from commercial sources were no longer available the result would
be a chronic shortage of blood which would reach emergency
proportions.
The consequences, therefore, of adopting a strict liability rule would appear to be of great potential medical harm
to the public while the benefits to the public would be small
in comparison.
It thus appears that there is no simple or "pat" answer
as to whether absolute liability is to be imposed upon suppliers of blood. However, it must be concluded that if substantial justice is to be done to the unfortunate patients
contracting hepatitis, and equally as important, to the
hospitals, supplying the patients with blood-life itself, the
courts must engage in the weighing of interest and policy
analysis approach in this area, attempted by the Florida
and New Jersey courts, and reject the artificial reasoning
adopted in Perlmnutter.

